Jos Boonstra The indipendence of Kosovo

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Dear Nicola,

'What represents for Europe the indipendence of Kosovo?'

The independence of Kosovo is both a relief as well as a long-term

concern for the European Union. A relief in the sense that no

substantial violence occurred. In the event that the US and several EU

member states would have denied the declaration of independence, chances

of social unrest and substantial violence in Kosovo would have been very

high. The people of Kosovo would not have accepted anything less then

independence. Also a relief because the days following independence were

not characterised by violence between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo.

Although there where understandable protests among the Serb community no

massive violence occurred.

The independence of Kosovo is a long-term concern for the EU because

both Kosovo as well as Serbia are crucial to peace and stability in

Europe. The UN is packing its bags while another hesitant player is

taking over. The European Union is setting-up a rule of law mission

consisting of 1900 police offers, custom officers, judges and

prosecutors. Serbia is currently trying to block the start of this

mission and argues that the UN should stay since the status has not been

resolved yet through the UN Security Council. The European Security and

Defence Policy (ESDP) mission will be backed by the present 17.000 NATO

troops. With the US role further declining in Kosovo implications for

the EU are increased commitment and responsibility.

'how this indipendence procmamed will influence the Balkan region

positively or negatively and the access of Serbia for future adhesion to

the European Union?'

The regional implications are likely to be mixed. Negative implications

in Macedonia are likely to be smoothed over by a NATO membership offer

in April. Speculation over demands for independence or border changes by

Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina seems unlikely. The main

risks of violence and threats to regional security will originate from

internal developments in Serbia - the further infusion of national

sentiments and possible unrest in the southern Presevo Valley that

harbours a large Albanian minority. But also from Kosovo that risks

suffering ethnic tensions in the coming time and might see an exodus of

Serbs moving north to Serbian controlled Mitrovica and beyond.

Weak international support for Kosovo could temper local enthusiasm in

making a fresh start. Prospects of a Kosovo that is a black hole, rife

with crime and corruption would become a self-fulfilling prophesy.

Serbia and Russia could hinder Kosovo's efforts to become a full-blown

state in every possible way, including by blocking membership of

international organisations. Most likely the northern part of Kosovo,

Mitrovica, where most Serbs live will remain to follow Belgrade's lead

as it always has done. Belgrade will not stop support of parallel

structures, including paying wages to local officials. Kosovar Serb

police officers have already stated not to be willing to work under

Pristina's rule. Meanwhile the Serb railways have taken over the line

from Serbia into Mitrovica. Kosovo's birth is likely to be marked by the

creation of a new frozen conflict resembling the Abkhazia and

South-Ossetia case in Georgia. The Mitrovica area would formally be part

of Kosovo but practically remain under Serbia's rule. A situation that

could block development in both countries just as before when Kosovo

formally belonged to Serbia but practically presided under international

rule. The development of good governance and the economy would still be

blocked through ethnic tensions. In the coming weeks and months it will

be up to the Pristina and Belgrade governments to avoid violence and to

international stakeholders - primarily the EU - to avoid a (frozen)

conflict over Mitrovica.

Yesterday the Serbian government coalition resigned because it was

unable to agree internally about the policy towards the EU. Whereas the

party of PM Kostunica demanded that Serbia would only work towards EU

integration when the latter would not recognise Kosovo's independence

the other (more EU-orientated) parties wanted to separate the issue of

EU membership with that of the loss of Kosovo. Elections will take place

on 11 May and are likely to be won by the radical nationalist party.

Serbia will need time to overcome the loss of Kosovo. The EU should be

engaged and try to bind Serbia to Europe (regardless of the government

that sits in Belgrade). EU engagement should be more sophisticated then

only offering a signed Stability and Association Agreement but should

give Serbia concrete economic advantages and a continuous dialogue, also

on the situation in Kosovo.

'US have seen in favour the indipendence of Kosovo and Russia against,

is not this little piece of land in the between of higher geopolitic and

geoconomic interests?'

Yes, to some extend the Kosovo issue has turned into a geopolitical

fight between the US and Russia over the last 18 months. Before the

official negotiations started Russia was mostly silent on the Kosovo

issue while the US promised the Kosovar Albanians independence (since it

saw no other practical solution for Kosovo remaining in Serbia whereas

ties over the last 8 years between Belgrade and Pristina had not

improved) .

Several reasons made Russia decide not to accept US supremacy over this

issue. First Russia has regained its assertiveness over the last few

years. Russia is not longer to follow the lead of the West but

formulates its own (more realist orientated) foreign policy. The new

assertiveness is for a large part based on Russian energy reserves and

high oil prices. Second, Russia was worried that the Kosovo case would

imply a precedent for unrecognised entities in its near abroad

(Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South-Ossetia) but even

within its borders in Chechnya. Why would these de-facto states not have

the right to independence was the main argument heard in these

territories. Third, Russia tries to regain influence, not only in

neighbouring countries but also in the Balkans. Serbia is a key Balkan

country with strong historical links to Russia. Together Russia and

Serbia had a strong legal case over Kosovo remaining within Serbia.

Lastly, Russia prefers to work with EU member states on a bilateral

basis (especially in the economic sphere). A divided EU over the Kosovo

issue serves Russian interests well. The US (and some EU members) made

their promises before Russia clearly spoke out on the issue and in that

sense the US put itself in a difficult position since no unanimity could

be reached in the UN Security Council.

I hope this is helpful.

Best regards,

Jos Boonstra

Senior Researcher FRIDE

Madrid, Spain

Jos Boonstra

Senior Researcher

Democratisation

MA in International Relations (2000) and in History (1997) from the University of Groningen, The Netherlands. Prior to joining FRIDE, Jos Boonstra was Programme Manager at the Centre for European Security Studies (CESS), Groningen, the Netherlands. At CESS some of his English-language publications included:

• ‘Higher Organisation of Defence: a Comparative Overview of Six European States. The Case for an Integrated Defence Organisation’, in Sami Faltas and Sander Jansen (ed.), Governance and the Military: Perspectives for Change in Turkey, CESS Harmonie Paper No. 19, April 2006 http://www.cess.org/publications/harmoniepapers/pdfs/HarmoniePaper19.pdf

• ‘Macedonia’ and ‘Serbia and Montenegro’ in D. Greenwood (ed.), The Western Balkans Candidates for NATO Membership and Partnership, CESS Harmonie Paper No. 18, December 2005 http://www.cess.org/publications/harmoniepapers/pdfs/HarmPap.18.colour.pdf

• Defence Reform Initiative for Bosnia and Herzegovina / Serbia and Montenegro. The Drina project’ Centre for European Security Studies, Occasional Paper No. 2, October 2005 (Editor) http://www.cess.org/publications/occasionals/pdfs/occasionals2.pdf

• ‘From a Weak State to a Reunified Moldova: New Opportunities to Resolve the Transdniestria Conflict’, NATO Defence College, Research Paper No. 23, October 2005 http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/publications/rp_23.pdf